A “Holding Company Exception” to Hertz? by Vincent, Lauren
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 83 Issue 4 Article 13 
Fall 2018 
A “Holding Company Exception” to Hertz? 
Lauren Vincent 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Lauren Vincent, A “Holding Company Exception” to Hertz?, 83 MO. L. REV. (2018) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol83/iss4/13 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
 NOTE 
A “Holding Company Exception” to Hertz? 
3123 SMB LLC v. Horn, 880 F.3d 461 (9th Cir. 2018) 
Lauren Vincent* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Diversity jurisdiction, as defined in 28 U.S.C. § 1332, requires that all 
persons on one side of a controversy be citizens of different states than all per-
sons on the other side.1  Specifically, § 1332(c) provides that a corporation is 
“a citizen of every State . . . by which it has been incorporated and of the State 
. . . where it has its principal place of business.”2  Defining the phrase “principal 
place of business,” however, has proven challenging for the federal courts.3  As 
a result, for several decades, courts developed and applied a plethora of tests 
that muddled the question of corporate citizenship, yielding widespread incon-
sistent results.4 
After the Supreme Court of the United States announced in Hertz Corp. 
v. Friend 5 that a corporation’s principal place of business is its “nerve center” 
– i.e., its “center of direction, control, and coordination” – the complexity as-
sociated with determining a corporation’s principal place of business seemed 
to be a thing of the past.6  Although the Hertz decision brought substantial 
clarity to the issue of corporate diversity jurisdiction, its one-size-fits-all test 
for determining principal place of business has proven less than straightforward 
when applied to modern corporate structures – notably, holding companies.  
This Note addresses one perplexing problem that Hertz’s “nerve center” test 
failed to anticipate: How should courts determine the “principal place of busi-
ness” of a corporation that is designed to engage in few, if any, substantial 
business activities, such as a holding corporation? 
 
* B.S., History Education, Missouri State University, 2016; J.D. Candidate, University 
of Missouri School of Law, 2019; Editor in Chief, Missouri Law Review, 2018–2019.  
I am grateful to Professor Dessem for his insight, guidance, and support during the 
writing of this Note, as well as the Missouri Law Review for its help in the editing 
process. 
 1. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (2018); Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 
(1996); see also infra notes 59–69 and accompanying text (explaining subject matter 
jurisdiction). 
 2. 28 U.S.C. § 1322(c)(1). 
 3. See infra Section III.B.1. 
 4. See infra Section III.B.1. 
 5. 559 U.S. 77 (2010). 
 6. Id. at 93.  Indeed, the Hertz decision extinguished all other preexisting tests 
for determining principal place of business.  Id. at 96. 
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Although some attempts have been made to reconcile the unique nature 
of holding corporations with Hertz’s “nerve center” test, the federal courts have 
begun crafting rules of corporate citizenship that deviate from Hertz precedent 
and pronounce new rules for determining the principal place of business of 
holding companies.7  The dangers of such deviation are perfectly showcased 
in the 2018 decision of 3123 SMB LLC v. Horn,8 where the Ninth Circuit held 
that a recently-formed holding corporation’s principal place of business can be 
located where it simply plans to hold board meetings – regardless of whether 
any such meetings have occurred prior to the filing of a lawsuit.9 
This Note argues the Ninth Circuit’s approach to determining the corpo-
rate citizenship of a newly-formed holding corporation strays considerably 
from Hertz precedent, announces a “holding company exception” to Hertz,10 
and invites small business owners to invent diversity jurisdiction through the 
convenient creation of holding corporations just days before filing in federal 
court.  This Note further argues that a newly-formed holding corporation’s 
principal place of business must not be based on where its high level officers 
intend to direct, control, and coordinate its activities at a future date but must 
instead be based on where its high-level officers are actually directing, control-
ling, and coordinating its activities at the time a lawsuit is filed.  Finally, this 
Note considers the ways in which the legislature and the courts can craft and 
interpret diversity jurisdiction rules to address the uniqueness of holding cor-
poration structures while remaining true to the holding announced in Hertz. 
II. FACTS AND HOLDING 
A limited liability company known as 3123 SMB LLC (the “LLC”) filed 
a legal malpractice action against attorney Steven J. Horn (“Horn”) (the “Law-
suit”) in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California after re-
taining Horn to represent it in an underlying property damage lawsuit.11  Due 
to the complex nature of the facts in 3123 SMB, LLC v. Horn, this Part proceeds 
chronologically in four Sections.  First, Section A summarizes the underlying 
property damage lawsuit filed in California state court.  Second, Section B de-
scribes the creation of the LLC and the subsequent termination of Horn’s rep-
resentation.  Third, Section C articulates the formation of Lincoln One Corpo-
 
 7. See, e.g., 3123 SMB LLC v. Horn, 880 F.3d 461 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 471. 
 10. Despite the fact that in Johnson v. SmithKline Beecham Corp. the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania stated, “[T]here is no indication that the Hertz Court intended to 
create a ‘holding company exception’ to its admonition that a corporation has only one 
nerve center,” this Note argues that this is precisely what the Third Circuit did in af-
firming the Eastern District’s judgment on appeal.  853 F. Supp. 2d 487, 495 (E.D. Pa. 
2012), aff’d, 724 F.3d 337 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).  Further, this Note argues 
that this is what the Ninth Circuit did in its decision of 3123 SMB LLC.   
 11. Id. at 463–64. 
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ration (the “Corporation”) – a holding corporation.  Lastly, Section D con-
cludes this Part with a summary of the legal malpractice lawsuit that is the 
subject of the diversity jurisdiction issue presented in the 3123 SMB, LLC v. 
Horn. 
A. The Underlying Property Damage Lawsuit 
In July of 2008, Anthony Kling and his mother, Mary Kling, brought suit 
against multiple defendants,12 claiming a nearby construction project was re-
sponsible for causing subsidence damage to an apartment building they owned 
in Santa Monica, California.13  The Klings retained Horn, a California attorney, 
to represent them in the dispute and filed their complaint in Los Angeles Supe-
rior Court.14 
B. The Creation of 3123 SMB LLC and Horn’s Termination 
In July of 2011, three years after the original filing of their property suit, 
the Klings organized the LLC15 in Missouri and listed its place of business as 
Clayton, Missouri.16  The Klings resided in California, but they claimed to have 
family and business connections in Missouri.17  The Klings transferred their 
ownership of the Santa Monica property to the LLC.18  The LLC’s sole busi-
ness activity was to manage the lawsuits that arose over the destruction of the 
Santa Monica property, and the Klings were the only persons authorized to act 
on the LLC’s behalf.19 
 
 12. Id. at 464 (citing Kling v. Hassid, No. B261391, 2016 WL 538238, at *1 n.2 
(Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 10, 2016).  The named defendants were “Joseph Hassid, Santa Mon-
ica Investments, LLC, and Bay Cities Discount Kitchen and Appliances, Inc.”  Kling 
v. Hassid, No. B261391, 2016 WL 538238, at *1 n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 10, 2016).  “In 
October 2008, [the Klings] amended their complaint to name Gabai [Construction, 
LLC,] as a defendant.”  Kling v. Gabai Constr., No. B235367, 2012 WL 5458924, at 
*1 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2012). 
 13. 3123 SMB LLC, 880 F.3d at 463; see also Gabai, 2012 WL 5458924, at *1. 
 14. 3123 SMB LLC, 880 F.3d at 463. 
 15. “A limited liability company (LLC) is a hybrid business entity that offers its 
members limited liability as if they were shareholders of a corporation[] but treats the 
entity and its members as a partnership for tax purposes.”  Ann. K Wooster, Annotation, 
Construction and Application of Limited Liability Company Acts – Issues Relation to 
Formation of Limited Liability Company and Addition or Disassociation of Members 
Thereto, 43 A.L.R. 6th 611, West (database updated weekly). 
 16. 3123 SMB LLC, 880 F.3d at 464. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id.  In May 2013, the Klings amended their original complaint in the property 
damage lawsuit and added the LLC as a new party plaintiff in all remaining state court 
litigation.  Id. 
 19. Id. 
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In October of 2013, the LLC terminated Horn’s representation after Horn 
failed to comply with certain California local court rules.20  As a result of 
Horn’s errors, the trial court dismissed the LLC’s case with prejudice for fail-
ure to bring the action to trial within five years – which is a violation of Cali-
fornia Code of Civil Procedure section 583.310.21 
C. The Incorporation of Lincoln One 
In September of 2014, roughly one year after the LLC terminated Horn’s 
representation, Mary Kling organized the Corporation.22  The Corporation’s 
Missouri attorney filed the necessary articles of incorporation and listed his 
office in Clayton, Missouri, as Mary Kling’s address.23  Shortly after its incor-
poration, the Corporation became the sole member of the LLC.24  Mary Kling 
served as the Corporation’s president, secretary, and only high-level officer; 
Anthony Kling served as a board member.25  The Corporation’s sole business 
was “to provide direction to [the LLC],” which included prosecution of the 
lawsuits concerning the damage done to the Klings’ Santa Monica property.26  
The Corporation’s articles of incorporation specified that its board meetings 
would occur in Clayton, Missouri.27 
D. The Legal Malpractice Lawsuit: 3123 SMB LLC v. Horn 
Twenty-five days after the Corporation’s incorporation, the LLC filed the 
Lawsuit.28  The LLC’s complaint alleged the Central District of California had 
subject matter jurisdiction to hear its case because the parties were of diverse 
 
 20. Id.; see Kling v. Hassid, No. B261391, 2016 WL 538238, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Feb. 10, 2016).  According to the LLC, certain exhibits proffered by Horn for a “Long 
Cause Binder,” required by California law, were “incomplete, inadequate, and did not 
allow the case to be properly prepared for trial.”  3123 SMB LLC, 880 F.3d at 463–64.  
 21. 3123 SMB LLC, 880 F.3d at 464; see Hassid, 2016 WL 538238, at *1; see also 
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 583.310 (West 2018). 
 22. 3123 SMB LLC, 880 F.3d at 464.  Under California law, legal malpractice 
claims must be brought within one year of their discovery to fall within the proper 
statute of limitations.  See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.6(a) (West 2018); see also Lee 
v. Hanley, 354 P.3d 334, 336–37 (Cal. 2015). 
 23. 3123 SMB LLC, 880 F.3d at 464.  All of Lincoln One’s corporate records were 
kept in the Missouri attorney’s Clayton office.  Id. at 465. 
 24. Id. at 464. 
 25. Id.  Anthony Kling owns seventy-five percent of the Corporation’s shares, and 
Mary Kling owns the remaining twenty-five percent.  Id. 
 26. Id. at 465. 
 27. Id. at 473; see also MO. REV. STAT. § 351.225.1(1) (2016); MODEL BUS. CORP. 
ACT § 7.01(b) (ABA 2016) (providing that a corporation’s “principal office” as desig-
nated in its annual report is its location of annual meetings if not otherwise specified); 
cf., e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 600(a) (West 2018); N.Y. BUS. CORP. L. § 602(a) (McKin-
ney 2017). 
 28. 3123 SMB LLC, 880 F.3d at 465; see id. at 467. 
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citizenship.29  According to the LLC, Horn was properly a citizen of California 
and the LLC was properly a citizen of Missouri because its sole member at the 
time the Lawsuit was filed – the Corporation – was properly a citizen of Mis-
souri.30 
The Corporation did not engage in any “fundamental daily real estate 
business operations” when the LLC filed the Lawsuit.31  Indeed, the Corpora-
tion’s only conceded business operation was to hold an annual meeting in Clay-
ton, Missouri, at which it planned to approve directors and officers, modify 
bylaws, and issue stock.32  Although the Corporation’s annual board meetings 
were described as taking place annually, no such meetings had been held at the 
time the Lawsuit was filed.33  Neither Anthony nor Mary Kling visited Mis-
souri between the date of the Corporation’s incorporation and the filing of the 
Lawsuit.34  In October of 2015, subsequent to the filing of the Lawsuit, the 
Corporation held one board meeting in Clayton, Missouri.35 
Horn moved to dismiss the Lawsuit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 
arguing that, under the “nerve center” test set forth by the Supreme Court of 
the United States in Hertz Corp v. Friend, the Corporation was properly a citi-
zen of California.36  In so arguing, Horn relied on the following language of 
the Court from Hertz: 
[I]f the alleged ‘nerve center’ [of a corporation] is nothing more than a 
mail drop box, a bare office with a computer, or the location of an an-
nual executive retreat, the court should instead take as the true ‘nerve 
center’ the place of actual direction, control, and coordination . . . .37 
 
 29. Complaint ¶¶ 2–3, 3123 SMB LLC, 880 F.3d 461 (2:14-cv-08115); see also 28 
U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2018) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil 
actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000 . . . and is 
between . . . citizens of different States.”). 
 30. Appellant’s Brief at 6, 3123 SMB LLC, 880 F.3d 461 (No. 16-55304), 2016 
WL 4208228, at *6; see also GMAC Commercial Credit LLC v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, 
Inc., 357 F.3d 827, 829 (8th Cir. 2004) (“[A]n LLC’s citizenship is that of its members 
for diversity jurisdiction purposes . . . .”); Cosgrove v. Bartolotta, 150 F.3d 729, 731 
(7th Cir. 1998).  See generally Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185 (1990) (con-
cluding that, unless Congress otherwise provides, members of an LLC are citizens for 
diversity purposes). 
 31. 3123 SMB LLC, 880 F.3d at 465. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Defendant-Appellee Steven Horn’s Answering Brief at 2, 3123 SMB LLC, 880 
F.3d 461 (No. 16–55304), 2016 WL 5929180, at 2 [hereinafter Horn’s Answering 
Brief] (“[T]he only evidence of any [Corporation] activity is Missouri is a single board 
meeting that occurred well after this case was filed . . . .”). 
 34. 3123 SMB LLC, 880 F.3d at 467; see also Horn’s Answering Brief, supra note 
33, at 7, 20. 
 35. 3123 SMB LLC, 880 F.3d at 464. 
 36. See Horn’s Answering Brief, supra note 33, at 29–30. 
 37. Id. at 14 (quoting Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 92–93 (2010)). 
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On this foundation, Horn argued the Corporation’s incorporation in Mis-
souri and intent to hold board meetings in Clayton, Missouri, sometime in the 
future was not enough to establish its corporate nerve center in Missouri.38  
According to Horn, the LLC’s principal place of business for purposes of di-
versity jurisdiction must have been California because the LLC provided no 
evidence that Mary Kling directed its activity from Missouri or anywhere be-
sides California.39  Therefore, because Horn was also a citizen of California, 
Horn argued the case was not between diverse parties and could not be heard 
in federal district court pursuant to the diversity jurisdiction requirements set 
forth in § 1332.40 
The LLC opposed Horn’s motion to dismiss the Lawsuit.41  Because the 
Corporation’s sole business purpose was managing lawsuits, the LLC argued 
that the Corporation’s activities “took place in conjunction with its outside 
counsel due to the narrow nature of its activities.”42  Put another way, the LLC 
argued that because its attorney is a citizen of Missouri, it, too, should be con-
sidered a citizen of Missouri. 
The Central District of California agreed with Horn and dismissed the 
Lawsuit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,43 concluding that California ra-
ther than Missouri was the Corporation’s principal place of business under 
Hertz’s “nerve test.”44  The court found that there was “no evidence that any 
of the operations of [the Corporation] are directed, controlled, or coordinated 
from Missouri or anywhere else other than California[;]” that Mary Kling – the 
only officer of the Corporation – was a resident of California and did not travel 
to Missouri with regularity; that the LLC’s attempt to rely on corporate docu-
mentation to establish the Corporation’s principal place of business was, with-
out more, insufficient proof that the Corporation’s nerve center was in Mis-
souri; and that it was “completely implausible” that the Corporation had not 
taken any actions in the twenty-five days of its existence.45 
The court also rejected the LLC’s argument that because the Corpora-
tion’s sole business purpose is managing lawsuits, the location of its outside 
attorney should definitively establish its principal place of business for diver-
sity purposes.46  Relying on the nerve test adopted by the Court in Hertz, the 
Central District of California reiterated that the actions of the Corporation’s 
“high level officers” control the principal place of business analysis rather than 
 
 38. Id. at 22. 
 39. Id. at 20. 
 40. See id. at 30–31. 
 41. Id. at 7. 
 42. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 30, at 13. 
 43. 3123 SMB LLC v. Horn, No. CV 14–8115 DSF, 2016 WL 2594625 (C.D. Cal. 
Feb. 16, 2016) (mem.). 
 44. 3123 SMB LLC v. Horn, No. CV 14–8115 DSF (FFMx), 2016 WL 6275168, 
at *1 (C.D. Cal. 2016), rev’d, 880 F.3d 461 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
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the location of outside persons the Corporation may hire.47  The court con-
cluded that the LLC had not established diversity jurisdiction and granted 
Horn’s motion to dismiss accordingly.48  Notably, the court did not make any 
finding of jurisdictional manipulation.49 
The LLC appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 
arguing the Central District of California erred in dismissing its case for lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction because the parties were, in fact, diverse in citi-
zenship.50  The LLC reiterated its argument that under Hertz’s “nerve center” 
test, what very little business the Corporation did was done in Missouri and 
that, as a result, Missouri must be the location of the Corporation’s principal 
place of business.51  Horn maintained that because the LLC failed to establish 
complete diversity existed with competent proof, the Central District of Cali-
fornia’s decision to dismiss the Lawsuit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
was “manifestly correct.”52 
The Ninth Circuit reversed the Central District of California’s jurisdic-
tional dismissal, finding that the LLC presented competent evidence that the 
Corporation’s minimal activity was directed from board meetings in Missouri, 
even though no such board meetings had been held prior to the filing of the 
Lawsuit.53  Therefore, the Ninth Circuit found that Missouri was indeed the 
Corporation’s – and, therefore, also the LLC’s – appropriate principal place of 
business for diversity jurisdiction purposes.54  The Ninth Circuit stated that its 
reversal was conditional, however, and advised that the Central District of Cal-
ifornia was “free to consider whether there [wa]s jurisdictional manipulation 
or an alter ego relationship between [the Corporation] and [the LLC]” on re-
mand.55 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
In 3123 SMB LLC, the Ninth Circuit relied primarily on its own interpre-
tation of Hertz to reach the decision that a holding corporation’s principal place 
of business is where it holds its board meetings, even if those meetings have 
yet to occur.  First, as a means of placing the Ninth Circuit’s holding in context, 
 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See id. 
 50. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 30, at 6. 
 51. Id. at 8, 11. 
 52. Horn’s Answering Brief, supra note 33, at 30–31. 
 53. 3123 SMB LLC v. Horn, 880 F.3d 461, 471 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id.  The alter ego doctrine allows a court to “pierce the corporate veil” and toss 
aside the norms of “treat[ing] a corporation as an entity distinct from its shareholders” 
if there is evidence that the corporation exerts a heightened level of control over its 
subsidiary.  Note, Piercing the Corporate Law Veil: The Alter Ego Doctrine Under 
Federal Common Law, 95 Hᴀʀᴠ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 853, 853–54 (1982); see discussion infra Sec-
tion III.C.1. 
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this Part addresses the constitutional and statutory bases for federal jurisdic-
tion.  Second, this Part examines how corporations fit within that federal juris-
dictional framework and discusses the Hertz decision, as well as its ramifica-
tions.  Finally, this Part examines how a holding corporation’s principal place 
of business has been determined in the post-Hertz era. 
A. The Jurisdictional Framework in the Federal Courts 
Jurisdiction is a threshold question of whether a federal court has the 
power to hear a particular case or controversy.56  It “depends upon the state of 
things at the time of the action brought.”57  This means that a court cannot 
consider the location or status of the parties at any time beyond the date the 
pleadings are filed.58 
While state courts have the power to hear all cases – except those that 
must be heard exclusively in other courts – and are considered courts of “gen-
eral or universal jurisdiction,”59  federal courts are courts of limited subject-
matter jurisdiction.60  Federal courts only have the power to hear cases that (1) 
fall within the limits of judicial power granted to them by Article III of the 
Constitution61 and (2) have been assigned to them by a congressional jurisdic-
tional grant of authority.62 
 
 56. Dustin M. Dow, Note, The Unambiguous Supremacy Clause, 53 B.C. L. REV. 
1009, 1017 (2012); see also Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 n.18 (1979) (explain-
ing the distinctions between jurisdiction, standing, and cause of action); Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 175 (1803). 
 57. Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Glob. Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 570 (2004) (citation 
omitted). 
 58. See id. 
 59. 12 MICHAEL D. MURRAY, MISSOURI PRACTICE SERIES: JURISDICTION, VENUE, 
LIMITATIONS § 8:381, West (database updated Aug. 2018).  For example, the federal 
courts alone have jurisdiction over “cases in which the United States is a party,” “cases 
involving violations of the Constitution or federal law,” crimes on federal land, and 
bankruptcy cases.  Federal vs. State Courts – Key Differences, FINDLAW, https://litiga-
tion.findlaw.com/legal-system/federal-vs-state-courts-key-differences.html (last vis-
ited Oct. 22, 2018). 
 60. 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 
JURISPRUDENCE § 3522, West (database updated Sept. 2018). 
 61. U.S. CONST. art. III. 
 62. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 60, § 3552.   
 
The Constitution provides that the ‘judicial Power shall extend’ to ‘Controver-
sies . . . between Citizens of different States’ . . . .  Th[e] language [of Art. III, 
§ 2] . . . does not automatically confer diversity jurisdiction upon the federal 
courts.  Rather, it authorizes Congress to do so and, in doing so, to determine 
the scope of the federal courts’ jurisdiction within constitutional limits.   
 
Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 84 (2010)).  
Because the Constitution explicitly limits the power of the federal courts, Congress may 
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Jurisdiction is most commonly conferred on the federal courts through a 
party’s invocation of federal question or diversity jurisdiction.63  Federal ques-
tion jurisdiction exists when the plaintiff’s cause of action arises under federal 
law.64  Diversity jurisdiction exists when a controversy involves citizens of 
different states and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 – even if the 
plaintiff’s cause of action arises solely under state law.65  Diversity jurisdiction 
was primarily created to protect out-of-state defendants against local bias and 
prejudice. 66  To effectuate this purpose, complete diversity requires that the 
 
not extend the power it grants to federal district courts beyond the scope of Article III.  
Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922). 
 63. See Michael G. Collins, Jurisdictional Exceptionalism, 93 VA. L. REV. 1829, 
1854–55 (2007) (discussing that a federal court may also have jurisdiction in limited 
circumstances other than federal question and diversity cases, such as admiralty cases); 
see also 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2018) (federal question jurisdiction); id. § 1332 (diversity 
jurisdiction). 
 64. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. (extending judicial power “to all cases, in law 
and equity, arising under . . . the laws of the United States.”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1331 
(“[D]istrict courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the 
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”).  Federal question jurisdiction is 
generally triggered when a “well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal law 
creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on 
resolution of a substantial question of federal law.”  Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. La-
borers Vacation Tr. for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 27–28 (1983); see also Louisville & Nash-
ville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 153–54 (1908).  However, federal question juris-
diction is beyond the scope of this Note and will not be discussed further. 
 65. 28 U.S.C. § 1332; see U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (extending judicial power 
“to Controversies . . . between Citizens of different States.”); see also Collins, supra 
note 63, at 1830–31.  Diversity jurisdiction requires that the amount in controversy 
exceed $75,000.  28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). 
 66. Ho v. Ikon Office Sols., Inc., 143 F. Supp. 2d 1163, 1164 (N.D. Cal. 2001) 
(“The primary purpose of the diversity statute is to avoid prejudice against ‘outsiders’ 
. . . .  The Congress that provided for diversity jurisdiction was concerned that a local 
jury sitting in state court might exhibit bias in favor of a ‘local’ party who was suing an 
out-of-state party.  Because federal courts draw from a wider jury pool, . . . federal 
court, so the theory goes, provides a more neutral forum.”); see Caitlin Sawyer, Note, 
Don’t Dissolve the “Nerve Center”: A Status-Linked Citizenship Test for Principal 
Place of Business, 55 B.C. L. REV. 641, 646 & n.38 (2014); see also U.S. CONST. art. 
III, § 2, cl. 1 (extending judicial power “to controversies . . . between Citizens of dif-
ferent States”); Smallwood v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 352 F.3d 220, 224 (5th Cir. 2003) (stating 
that one rationale underlying diversity jurisdiction is to “allow defendants to flee the 
state courts”); Rooney v. Tyson, 127 F.3d 295, 297 n.1 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[T]he object 
of diversity jurisdiction [is to present] the actual parties to a litigation with a neutral, 
federal, playing field.”). 
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opposing parties be citizens of different states.67  Neither Article III of the Con-
stitution nor § 1332, however, explicitly mention corporations.68  As a result, 
courts have expressed some uncertainty over how corporations should be 
treated for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.69 
B. Diversity Jurisdiction and the Evolution of the Federal Court’s 
Treatment of Corporations 
“A corporation is an inanimate entity . . . .”70  When a group of persons 
establish themselves in accordance with certain legal rules, they collectively 
become an “artificial being” with a distinct legal personality.71  Originally, the 
Supreme Court of the United States concluded a corporation in and of itself 
was “certainly not a citizen” for purposes of diversity jurisdiction; a corpora-
tion was instead a “mere legal entity” whose jurisdiction depended on the citi-
zenship of each of its individuals members.72  Prior to 1958, courts adhered to 
the “forum doctrine,” which provided “that if a suit was brought by or against 
a corporation with multiple states of incorporation in one of its states of incor-
poration, . . .  the [corporation] would be treated as if it were only a citizen of 
the forum state” for diversity purposes.73  This view created a high potential 
 
 67. 28 U.S.C. § 1332; Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267, 267 (1806), overruled 
in part by Louisville, Cincinnati, & Charleston R.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. 497 
(1844), superseded by statute, Jurisdiction and Removal Act of 1875, ch. 137, § 2, 18 
Stat. 470, 470–71 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1332).  See generally Gilbert v. David, 
235 U.S. 561 (1915); Robertson v. Cease, 97 U.S. 646 (1878).  “A person is considered 
a citizen of a state if that person is domiciled within the state and is a citizen of the 
United States.”  WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 60, § 3611. 
 68. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 60, § 3623. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Francis C. Amendola et al., 18 C.J.S. Corporations § 1, West (database up-
dated Sept. 2018). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. 61, 86, 91–92 (1809), overruled in 
part by Letson, 43 U.S. 497, superseded by statute, Jurisdiction and Removal Act of 
1875, ch. 137, § 2, 18 Stat. 470, 470–71 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2018)); 
see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 60, § 3522. 
 73. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 60, § 3626.  For example, 
 
if a Massachusetts citizen had sued a Delaware and Massachusetts corporation 
in a federal court in Delaware, diversity would have existed because the corpo-
ration would have been considered a citizen solely of Delaware; however, if the 
action had been brought in a Massachusetts federal court, there would have been 
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for abuse, however, as a corporation could easily attain a federal forum by 
merely reincorporating in a different state.74 
Courts abandoned the forum doctrine in 1958 when Congress added § 
1332(c) to title 28 of the United States Code, which provides that a corporation 
is a citizen of (1) any state in which it is incorporated and (2) the state where 
its principal place of business is located.75  This “dual citizenship” standard 
was created as a way of reducing the number of corporate cases heard in the 
federal courts on the basis of diversity citizenship,76 therefore easing the work-
load of federal judges77 and preventing frauds on and abuses of federal juris-
diction.78  The creation of dual citizenship for corporations also “reflected the 
reality that a corporation is unlikely to suffer out-of-state prejudice if it has its 
principal place of business in that state.”79  Determining a corporation’s state 
of incorporation is a straight-forward inquiry, but uncovering a corporation’s 
principal place of business has always presented a complex inquiry for the fed-
eral courts – in both the pre-Hertz and post-Hertz legal landscape. 
1. Determining Principal Place of Business Before Hertz 
In the years following the enactment of § 1332(c) and before Hertz was 
decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, federal courts consulted 
 
 74. See, e.g., Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab 
& Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928) (finding a business was incorporated in one state 
for the sole purpose of forming a contract with a railroad company located in another 
state and to create diversity of citizenship and jurisdiction in the federal courts), super-
seded by Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77 (2010).  Reincorporation in another state 
is a relatively easy process and most states provide step-by-step information about how 
to file the necessary paperwork for incorporation, most of which can be done online.   
See, e.g., Starting a Business, MO. SECRETARY OF ST., https://www.sos.mo.gov/busi-
ness/corporations/startbusiness (last visited Oct. 23, 2018). 
 75. Pub. L. No. 85–554 § 2, 72 Stat 415 (1958) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332 (c)).  Note that an individual is considered a citizen of the state in which she is 
domiciled under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).  See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).  The definitional dif-
ference between the citizenship of individuals and the citizenship of corporations is 
thought to “reflect[] the reality that a corporation may have a presence sufficient to 
render it a ‘citizen’ of more than one state.”  Sawyer, supra note 66, at 646. 
 76. Kelly v. U.S. Steel Corp., 284 F.2d 850, 852 (3d. Cir. 1960).  See generally 
Canton v. Angelina Cas. Co., 279 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1960); Nat’l Spinning Co. v. Wash-
ington, 312 F. Supp. 958 (E.D.N.C. 1970); Knee v. Chem. Leaman Tank Lines, Inc., 
293 F. Supp. 1094, 1095 (E.D. Pa. 1968); Carter v. Clear Fir Sales Co., 284 F. Supp. 
386 (D. Or. 1967). 
 77. Egan v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 324 F.2d 565, 565 (2d Cir. 1963); Gilardi v. 
Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe Ry. Co., 189 F. Supp. 82, 85 (N.D. Ill. 1960). 
 78. Gilardi, 189 F. Supp. at 85–86.   For example, the “principal place of business” 
provision was necessary to remedy situations in which a wholly-local operation was 
deemed a citizen of a foreign state for diversity purposes merely because it happened 
to be incorporated there.  Id. 
 79. Sawyer, supra note 66, at 647; see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 60, § 3624. 
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several multifactor tests when determining a corporation’s principal place of 
business.80  The following tests were predominantly employed by the courts in 
the pre-Hertz era: (1) the “center of corporate activity” test;81 (2) the “nerve 
center” test;82 and (3) the facts-and-circumstances-based “total activity” test, 
which represented a hybrid of the center of corporate activity and nerve center 
tests.83  After analyzing the structure and activities of the corporation at issue, 
a federal court would select the test that seemed best suited to its inquiry of the 
“corporation’s center of gravity” and apply it accordingly.84  Courts differed 
somewhat in their formulation and application of these tests, which produced 
inconsistent results.85 
Although the multifactor tests provided the courts with flexibility in de-
termining a corporation’s principal place of business, such flexibility came “at 
the expense of uniformity, predictability, and administrative simplicity.”86  The 
Supreme Court of the United States’ landmark decision of Hertz Corp. v. 
 
 80. Sawyer, supra note 66, at 648. 
 81. Id. at 649.  The “center of corporate activity” test concluded that a corpora-
tion’s principal place of business was the place where a corporation’s assets and day-
to-day operations could be physically found.  Id.  This test focused primarily on visible, 
substantial operations of a corporation in a given state and was usually applied if a 
corporation had relatively centralized activities in one or a few states rather than spread 
across multiple states.  See, e.g., Grand Union Supermarkets of the Virgin Islands, Inc. 
v. H.E. Lockhart Mgmt., Inc., 316 F.3d 408, 411 (3d Cir. 2003).  “This test was some-
times referred to as the ‘place of operations’ or the ‘corporate operations’ test.”  Saw-
yer, supra note 66, at 648 n.54.  In the First Circuit, this approach became the “locus 
of operations” test.  Id. 
 82. Sawyer, supra note 66, at 648.  The nerve center was defined as the location 
“from which [a corporation’s] officers direct, control, and coordinate” activities “in the 
furtherance of the corporate objective.”  Id. at 649 (citing Scot Typewriter Co. v. Un-
derwood Corp., 170 F. Supp. 862, 865 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).  “[C]ourts reasoned that the 
nerve center test should apply when the center of corporate activity test failed to iden-
tify the state in which the corporation was least likely to suffer prejudice in state courts.” 
Id. 
 83. Id.  Courts employed the total activity test to assess “the totality of the corpo-
rate existence.”  Id.  Federal courts reasoned that the total activity test permitted flexi-
bility “to account for differing activities and structures among corporations.”  Id.  The 
implementation of this test was widely contested among federal courts of appeals, how-
ever.  E.g., id. at 650 n.70; Teal Energy USA, Inc. v. GT, Inc., 369 F.3d 873, 876 (5th 
Cir. 2004); Capitol Indem. Corp. v. Russellville Steel Co., 367 F.3d 831, 836 (8th Cir. 
2004), abrogated by Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77 (2010); Gadlin v. Sybron Int’l 
Corp., 222 F.3d 797, 799 (10th Cir. 2000); Gafford v. Gen. Electric Co., 997 F.2d 150, 
162–63 (6th Cir. 1993), abrogated by Hertz Corp., 559 U.S. 77; see also WRIGHT ET 
AL., supra note 60, § 3624. 
 84. Sawyer, supra note 66, at 648. 
 85. Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, Determination of Corporation’s Principal Place 
of Business for Purposes of Diversity Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C.A. Section 1332(c), 
6 A.L.R. Fed. 436, West (database updated weekly). 
 86. Sawyer, supra note 66, at 650 (citing Hertz Corp., 559 U.S. at 92). 
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Friend in 2010 addressed these competing benefits and expenses and an-
nounced a uniform rule for courts to follow when tasked with making corporate 
citizenship determinations. 
2. Hertz Corp. v. Friend and the “Nerve Center” Test for Determining 
Principal Place of Business 
In 2010, the Supreme Court of the United States stated a clear rule for 
determining a corporation’s principal place of business in Hertz Corp. v. 
Friend.87  Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Stephen G. Breyer an-
nounced that the appropriate test for determining the principal place of business 
was the “nerve center” approach,88 which the Court believed would usually be 
found at the place where a corporation’s “high level officers direct, control, 
and coordinate the corporation’s activities” or at the corporation’s headquar-
ters.89  In so holding, the Court expressly excluded the various preexisting mul-
tifactor approaches.90 
Two fundamental rationales underpinned the Court’s determination that 
the “nerve center” test was superior to the preexisting tests.91  First, the Court 
reasoned that only one “prominent” place of business (i.e., “a single, determi-
nable location within a state”)92 was contemplated by the text of § 1332(c)(1).93  
The Court further explained that this “prominent” location is not found in the 
state where the corporation enjoys its highest volume of business activity but 
is instead found in the state where the corporation’s headquarters is located.94 
Second, the Court stressed the importance of announcing a simple rule 
for corporate diversity jurisdiction that produces an efficient and predictable 
result, thus benefitting both the federal courts and corporations.95  The Court 
noted that administrative simplicity is a “major virtue in a jurisdictional statute 
. . .  [because c]omplex jurisdictional tests complicate a case, eating up time 
and money as the parties litigate, not the merits of their claims, but which court 
 
 87. 559 U.S. 77. 
 88. In announcing the “nerve center” test, the Court essentially adopted the “nerve 
center” test first announced by the Southern District of New York in Scot Typewriter 
Co. v. Underwood Corp., 170 F. Supp. 862, 864–65 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). 
 89. See Hertz Corp., 559 U.S. at 88. 
 90. Id. at 92–93. 
 91. Id. at 93.  Some scholars suggest that the Hertz Court provided a third rationale 
or consideration for deeming the “nerve center” test superior to other possibilities: leg-
islative history.  WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 60, § 3624. 
 92. Sawyer, supra note 66, at 651. 
 93. Hertz Corp., 559 U.S. at 93.  The statute references that “a corporation [is] 
deemed a citizen of every State and foreign state by which it has been incorporated” 
but only of “the State or foreign state where it has its principal place of business.”  28 
U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2018) (emphasis added). 
 94. Hertz Corp., 559 U.S. at 93. 
 95. Id. at 94. 
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is right to decide those claims.”96  The Court advised, however, that ease of 
administration should not come at the expense of locating the “place of actual 
direction, control, and coordination” of a corporation.97  The Court also cau-
tioned against the potential for jurisdictional manipulation, stating that if “the 
alleged ‘nerve center’ is nothing more than a mail drop box, a bare office with 
a computer, or the location of an annual executive retreat . . . ,” then the true 
nerve center should be “the place of actual direction control and coordina-
tion.”98 
C. The Problem with Defining a Holding Corporation’s Principal 
Place of Business Under Hertz 
The inherent difficulties in defining a corporation’s principal place of 
business under § 1332(c)(1) and in applying Hertz’s nerve center test are in-
tensified by the abundance of corporate structures that exist in the twenty-first-
century business world.99  The Hertz Court anticipated such difficulties and 
forewarned that the “nerve center” test it adopted will not “automatically gen-
erate a result” in all instances.100  The Hertz Court further accepted that the use 
of a “nerve center” test may sometimes “produce results that seem to cut 
against the basic rationale” for the diversity statute but stated that “accepting 
occasional[] counterintuitive results is the price the legal system must pay to 
avoid overly complex jurisdictional administration . . . .”101 
Notwithstanding this dicta, in the years following the Hertz decision, fed-
eral courts have expressed uncertainty about whether Hertz precedent controls 
the principal place of business inquiry as applied to certain complex corporate 
structures in modern business.102  In the same vein, the question of whether 
holding corporations in particular can be fairly analyzed according to Hertz’s 
 
 96. Id. (citation omitted). 
 97. Id. at 97. 
 98. Id. (emphasis added). 
 99. See id. at 96 (observing that the principal place of business is less clear when 
the corporation’s headquarters is located in one state but its most visible activities occur 
in a different state); see also John T. Mitchell, Home Is Where the Nerve Center Is: 
Locating a Corporation’s Principal Place of Business, GPSOLO, Oct./Nov. 2011, at 36, 
37–38 (observing that it is often difficult to locate the physical location of manage-
ment’s decisions – particularly when a corporation’s meetings occur by teleconfer-
ence); Cent. W. Va. Energy Co., Inc. v. Mountain State Carbon, LLC, 636 F.3d 101, 
107 n.3 (4th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he proliferation of complex corporate structures among 
business enterprises may compel further attention to the issue of ‘principal place of 
business’ under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.”). 
 100. Hertz Corp., 559 U.S. at 95–96. 
 101. Id. at 96. 
 102. Cent. W. Va. Energy Co., 636 F.3d at 107 n.3 (“We recognize that the prolif-
eration of complex corporate structures among business enterprises may compel further 
attention to the issue of ‘principal place of business’ under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.”). 
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nerve center test has been called into question.103  This Section first describes 
the nature of holding corporations and the relationship they have to limited 
liability companies and then analyzes how the lower federal courts have con-
ducted the principal place of business inquiry with respect to them. 
1. The Nature of Holding Corporations 
A holding corporation is “a corporation organized to hold the shares of 
another or other corporations.”104  These shares are frequently held in limited 
liability companies.105  “[T]he dominant characteristic of a holding company 
is the ownership of securities by which it is possible to control or substantially 
to influence the policies and management of one or more operating companies 
in a particular field of enterprise.”106 
As of 2018, an increasing number of small business owners are formulat-
ing businesses according to the “holding company” structure.107  A holding 
corporation can hardly be characterized as operating a normal business because 
it is designed to simply hold interest in other companies and has no principal 
 
 103. See id. 
 104. 6A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 
§ 2821, West (database updated Sept. 2018).  A holding corporation, commonly called 
an umbrella company or parent company, is one that “owns a controlling interest in 
another company, called a subsidiary” or limited liability company.  Jean Murray, 
Should I Form a Holding Company for My Businesses?, BALANCE, https://www.the-
balance.com/should-i-form-a-holding-company-for-my-businesses-3974575 (last up-
dated Oct. 6, 2018). 
 105. Joshua Kennon, Understanding a Holding Company: A Basic Introduction to 
Holding Companies & How They Work, https://www.thebalance.com/understanding-a-
holding-company-357341 (last updated Oct. 16, 2018).  The shares could also be held 
in limited partnerships, private equity funds, hedge funds, publicly traded stocks, 
bonds, real estate, song rights, brand names, patents, trademarks, copyrights, or virtu-
ally anything else with value.  Id. 
 106. FLETCHER, supra note 104, § 2821 (quoting N. Am. Co. v. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, 327 U.S. 686, 701 (1946)). 
 107. See Murray, supra note 104.  There are several reasons that a holding company 
structure is appealing in the modern business world.  See Jim Woodruff, The Ad-
vantages of a Holding Company, https://smallbusiness.chron.com/advantages-holding-
company-24217.html (last updated June 29, 2018).  Because the holding company 
structure allows for ownership and control of many different companies, a holding com-
pany will likely be able to obtain certain tax-free dividends, depending on what per-
centage of ownership an investor holds.  Id.  In addition, holding companies may benefit 
from reduced risk exposure – as compared to a traditional business model – because 
the only risk the holding company has is the capital it invested at the outset.  See id.  
The holding company also often benefits from the goodwill and reputation of the other 
companies it owns and controls while being sheltered from risks faced by the other 
companies in the case of legal issues, tax liabilities, and lawsuits.  See id.  Further, the 
creation of a holding company provides several perks related to the diversity of assets, 
increased raising of capital, borrowing and lending money with the other companies, 
and corporate policymaking.  Id. 
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place of business in way the term is commonly construed.  Despite its unusually 
low levels of activity, however, a holding corporation continues to legally ex-
ist, and the nature of its structure raises important questions regarding jurisdic-
tional citizenship. 
The relationship between a holding corporation and a limited liability 
company is rather unique.  A limited liability company is treated as a partner-
ship rather than a corporation in the eyes of the law, and its citizenship is de-
termined by the citizenship of its members.108  Thus, in determining a limited 
liability company’s principal place of business for diversity jurisdiction pur-
poses, a court must look to the citizenship of each of its members.109  Because 
a holding corporation is frequently the sole member of a limited liability com-
pany, a holding corporation’s citizenship often plays a controlling role in de-
termining the citizenship of a limited liability company. 
Generally, a holding corporation has a separate corporate existence from 
its operating companies and is to be treated as a separate entity, despite its 
aforementioned ability to exert control or influence over those companies.110  
But if the holding company was created as “a mere sham” or if the holding 
company’s organization and control indicates that it is simply an instrumental-
ity of another corporation – otherwise referred to as an “alter ego” – then the 
holding company will not be viewed as having a legally separate identity and 
will take on the citizenship of the company over which it exerts control.111 
2. The Principal Place of Business Problem for Holding Corporations 
After Hertz 
Few federal court decisions have addressed how the “atypical factual sce-
nario”112 presented in cases that involve holding corporations should be 
squared with Hertz precedent.  Indeed, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit is the only federal appellate court to grapple with Hertz’s application to 
holding corporations as of the time this Note was written.  This Section exam-
ines the Third Circuit’s decision in Johnson v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.113 
In Johnson, two joint plaintiffs filed a personal injury action against a 
defendant limited liability company (“GSK LLC”) with a holding company 
 
 108. Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 412, 420 (3d Cir. 2010); 
Brewer v. SmithKline Beacham Corp., 774 F. Supp. 2d 720, 725 (E.D. Pa. 2011). 
 109. Zambelli, 592 F.3d at 420; Brewer, 774 F. Supp. 2d at 725. 
 110. FLETCHER, supra note 104, § 2821. 
 111. Id.; see also Danjaq, S.A. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., 979 F.2d 772, 775 (9th 
Cir. 1992) (discussing the possibility of an alter ego relationship between a holding 
company and a subsidiary). 
 112. Brewer, 774 F. Supp. 2d at 725. 
 113. 724 F.3d 337 (3d Cir. 2013). 
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(“GSK Holdings”) as it single member.114  One plaintiff was a citizen of Lou-
isiana.115  The other plaintiff was a citizen of Pennsylvania.116  The citizenship 
of GSK Holdings and – by extension – GSK LLC was disputed by the par-
ties.117  GSK Holdings was incorporated in Delaware but engaged in very lim-
ited activities in that state.118  GSK Holdings’ three-person board of directors 
held short (fifteen-to-thirty minute) quarterly board meetings in Wilmington, 
Delaware, with some members appearing telephonically.119  At the time the 
Johnson lawsuit was filed, GSK Holdings had conducted approximately forty 
board meetings.120 
The extent of the actual decision-making that occurred at GSK Holdings’ 
board meetings was disputed by the parties.121  The plaintiffs argued the board 
meetings served “merely to ratify decisions” that were actually made in Penn-
sylvania and that diversity jurisdiction was improper.122  The defendants main-
tained GSK Holdings’ directors “reached decisions about [the corporation’s] 
investments only at [the Wilmington, Delaware,] board meetings and based on 
their own independent judgment” and that diversity jurisdiction was proper.123  
The Third Circuit agreed with the defendants, holding that GSK Holdings’ 
principal place of business, or “nerve center,” was Delaware because the “‘sin-
gle direction’ in which the nerve center test points [wa]s towards the location 
of [the holding company’s decisions to adopt binding resolutions affecting the 
corporation’s investments].”124  Thus, by extension, the Third Circuit held that 
GSK LLC’s principal place of business was also Delaware.125 
The plaintiffs relied on a “delegation theory” to support their position that 
GSK Holdings’ principal place of business was Pennsylvania,126 which was 
proposed in related litigation about the proper nerve center of GSK Holdings 
 
 114. Id. at 340–41. 
 115. Id. at 340. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 340–41. 
 118. Id. at 340, 342–43. 
 119. Id. at 342. 
 120. The holding company at issue in Johnson had been conducting short board 
meetings in Wilmington, Delaware, quarterly since 2001, and the Johnson lawsuit was 
filed on August 26, 2011.  Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id at 356; see also Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 96 (2010) (reasoning 
that “the “nerve center” test “points courts in a single direction, toward the center of 
overall direction, control and coordination.”). 
 125. Johnson, 724 F.3d at 356. 
 126. Johnson, 724 F.3d at 349.  The plaintiffs also argued that, when looking solely 
at the activities of GSK Holdings, it was clear that GSK Holdings’ principal place of 
business is located in Pennsylvania.  Id.  Based on all the evidence presented in the 
case, the Third Circuit held that GSK Holdings’ activities of direction, coordination 
and control took place in Wilmington, Delaware.  Id. at 354–56. 
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and which was rooted in a series of opinions written by Judge Timothy J. Sav-
age on the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania – Pat-
ton,127 Maldonado,128 and Brewer.129  The plaintiffs argued that, when making 
the principal place of business determination for GSK Holdings, the court 
should have considered GSK LLC’s activities because GSK Holdings dele-
gated its authority to manage GSK LLC to GSK LLC’s managers.130 
The Third Circuit acknowledged the plaintiffs’ proposed theory but did 
not ultimately find it persuasive.131  The Third Circuit held that the delegation 
theory’s influence on the nerve center test ignores well-established precedent 
that “a parent corporation maintains separate citizenship from its subsidiary 
unless it has exerted such an overwhelming level of control over the subsidiary 
that the two companies do not retain separate identities.”132  The Third Circuit 
also rejected Judge Savage’s reasoning in Brewer that “[w]here the sole mem-
ber of a limited liability company is a holding company . . . [, the court is] 
presented with an anomaly in applying the ‘nerve center’ test,” and should take 
the limited liability company’s activities into consideration, despite the well-
settled principle that the citizenship of a limited liability company is deter-
mined by the citizenship of each of its members.133 
The Third Circuit concluded the corporate structure existing between 
GSK Holdings and GSK LLC was “hardly anomalous” and further asserted 
that holding companies are “ubiquitous, especially in large business enter-
prises,” and pre-Hertz courts “have been determining their nerve centers for 
decades.”134  As a result, the Third Circuit held the fact that a holding company 
holds a limited liability company “does not, in itself, complicate the nerve cen-
ter analysis” announced in Hertz.135 
Despite the foregoing conclusion, the Third Circuit concluded that the 
dicta in Hertz, which cautioned courts to consider that a corporation’s nerve 
center is normally “not simply an office where the corporation holds board 
meetings,” was inapplicable when the corporation at issue is a holding com-
pany.136  According to the Third Circuit, “the kind of board meetings deni-
grated in Hertz were being considered in the context of a case involving a 
 
 127. Patton ex rel. Daniels–Patton v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 2011 WL 
6210724 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 14, 2011). 
 128. Maldonado ex rel. Maldonado v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 841 F. Supp. 2d 
890 (E.D. Pa. 2011). 
 129. Brewer v. SmithKline Beacham Corp., 774 F. Supp. 2d 720 (E.D. Pa. 2011).  
Brewer provided the core of the analysis of the two explanations provided.  Johnson, 
724 F.3d at 349 n.13 (citing Brewer, 774 F. Supp. 2d at 729–32). 
 130. Id at 349. 
 131. Id. at 352–53. 
 132. Id. at 351. 
 133. Id. at 351 (first and second alteration in original); see supra Section III.C.1. 
 134. Johnson, 724 F.3d at 351. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 347 (quoting Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 93 (2010)). 
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sprawling operating company with extensive activities . . . .”137  In distinguish-
ing the holding of the Court in Hertz, the Third Circuit noted that, when the 
company at issue is merely a holding company, “relatively short, quarterly 
board meetings may well be all that is required to direct and control the com-
pany’s limited work.”138  It concluded that, in cases involving holding compa-
nies, “[t]he location of board meetings is . . . a more significant jurisdictional 
fact . . . than it was in Hertz, and the meetings’ brevity does not necessarily 
reflect an absence of substantive decision-making.”139 
Judge Thomas L. Ambro concurred in part and concurred in the judgment 
but wrote a separate opinion because he feared the majority’s conclusion re-
garding the principal place of business of GSK Holdings was “in tension with 
Hertz.”140  Judge Ambro expressed skepticism that a corporation’s status as a 
holding company must change the Hertz analysis.141  Indeed, Judge Ambro 
noted the Johnson majority did not point to any case endorsing its view that 
sole reliance on the location of the board of directors meetings can properly 
determine a holding company’s principal place of business.142 
Judge Ambro worried that the majority’s approach in Johnson “w[ould] 
encourage parties to shift the location or formal authority of their corporate 
boards in order to create citizenship where those board meetings are held.”143  
Further, Judge Ambro cautioned that “unless Hertz is changed or clarified by 
the Supreme Court [of the United States], [the Third Circuit’s holding] sets an 
incorrect precedent that will affect corporate citizenship rulings in future 
cases.”144  According to Judge Ambro, the nerve center test should “appl[y] 
uniformly to all companies unless the Supreme Court [of the United States 
says] otherwise.”145 
IV. INSTANT DECISION 
Part IV examines several facets of the Ninth Circuit’s 3123 SMB LLC 
decision.  First, Section A dissects the majority opinion’s holding and reason-
ing, as authored by Judge Jacqueline H.N. Nguyen.  Second, Section B ana-
lyzes the reasoning presented in Judge Andrew D. Hurwitz’s dissent. 
 
 137. Id. at 354 (quotations omitted). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 361 (Ambro, J., concurring).  Judge Ambro believed that GSK Holdings’ 
principal place of business was located in the United Kingdom rather than Pennsylvania 
or Delaware.  Id. 
 141. Id. at 361–62.  Judge Ambro said this was so even though the company at issue 
in Hertz was an operating company.  Id. at 362. 
 142. Id. at 362. 
 143. Id. at 364. 
 144. Id. at 361. 
 145. Id. at 364. 
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A. The Majority Opinion 
In 3123 SMB LLC v. Horn, the Ninth Circuit held – as a matter of first 
impression – that, for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, “a recently-formed 
holding company’s principal place of business is the place where it plans to 
hold its board meetings, regardless of whether any meetings have occurred 
prior to filing a lawsuit, unless evidence shows that the corporation is directed 
from elsewhere.”146 
The court reached this conclusion in three steps.  First, the court set out 
the well-established, general rules for determining corporate citizenship when 
a lawsuit involves a limited liability company and a holding corporation.147  
Second, much like Prince Charming’s attempt in Disney’s Cinderella to find 
his true love by conducting the “glass slipper test,” the Ninth Circuit sought the 
“perfect fit” for the Corporation in 3123 SMB LLC by comparing its activities 
to preexisting case law involving holding companies as well as companies oth-
erwise deemed inactive.148  Third, with the foregoing in mind, the court ulti-
mately returned to the language of Hertz and, with Hertz as a guide, developed 
its own approach for classifying the Corporation’s citizenship in 3123 SMB 
LLC.149 
1. The Corporation and the LLC Have Distinct Legal Identities 
At the outset, the Ninth Circuit echoed the well-established rule that, 
“[f]or purposes of diversity jurisdiction, a limited liability company ‘is a citizen 
of every state of which its owners/members are citizens.’”150  Therefore, be-
cause the Corporation was the sole member of the LLC in 3123 SMB LLC, the 
court concluded the Corporation’s citizenship was dispositive on the issue of 
whether Horn and the LLC were diverse.151 
Applying the Johnson rule regarding the existence of an alter ego rela-
tionship152 to the facts of 3123 SMB LLC v. Horn, the Ninth Circuit concluded 
that the identities, and therefore the citizenship, of the Corporation and the LLC 
 
 146. 3123 SMB LLC v. Horn, 880 F.3d 461, 468 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 147. Id. at 465–67. 
 148. Id. at 467–68. 
 149. Id. at, 468–70. 
 150. Id. at 465 (quoting Johnson v. Columbia Props. Anchorage, LP, 437 F.3d 894, 
899 (9th Cir. 2006)). 
 151. Id. 
 152. The citizenship of a holding corporation is separate and distinct from that of 
its subsidiary limited liability company “unless it has exerted such an overwhelming 
level of control over” the limited liability company.  Id. at 467 (quoting Johnson v. 
SmithKline Beecham Corp., 724 F.3d 337, 351 (3d Cir. 2013)); see supra Section 
III.C.2. 
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must be considered separate and distinct because no clear evidence supported 
the view that the two companies were alter egos.153 
2. The Ninth Circuit’s Application of Hertz to Holding Corporation 
and Inactive Corporation Precedent 
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the appropriate method for deter-
mining a corporation’s citizenship is to apply the “nerve center” test estab-
lished by the Supreme Court of the United States in Hertz, which stipulates that 
a corporation’s principal place of business 
should normally be the place where the corporation maintains its head-
quarters – provided that the headquarters is the actual center of direc-
tion, control, and coordination . . . and not simply an office where the 
corporation holds its board meetings (for example, attended by directors 
and officers who have traveled there for the occasion).154 
Because a holding company engages in low levels of activity by its very 
nature, the Ninth Circuit classified such companies as “not normal” and looked 
to how other jurisdictions have applied Hertz to corporations that have been 
deemed atypical.155  The Ninth Circuit spent considerable time analyzing how 
the Third Circuit applied Hertz’s definition of corporate citizenship to a hold-
ing company in Johnson.156  It concluded, however, that the Corporation at 
issue in 3123 SMB LLC was even less active than the corporation analyzed in 
Johnson, as it was a mere twenty-five days old on the date the lawsuit was filed 
in federal court, and incorporating was the only business it had conducted in 
that brief window.157 
The Ninth Circuit also looked at how other jurisdictions have applied 
Hertz to the “somewhat analogous context” of corporations that are in the pro-
cess of dissolving and are otherwise inactive.158  Although the court acknowl-
edged that the U.S. Courts of Appeal for the Third and Eleventh “[C]ircuits 
have [ruled] that a dissolved corporation has no principal place of business for 
 
 153. 3123 SMB LLC, 880 F.3d at 468.  The Ninth Circuit suggested the Central 
District of California may have erroneously believed that an alter ego relationship ex-
isted between the Corporation and the LLC because the two entities are both managed 
by the Klings and utilize the same Missouri-based attorneys.  Id. 
 154. Id. at 465 (alteration in original) (quoting Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 
93 (2010)). 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 465–66.  The Ninth Circuit also analyzed how the First Circuit made a 
finding of corporate citizenship involving a holding company in the pre-Hertz case of 
Taber Partners, I v. Merit Builders, Inc., 987 F.2d 57 (1st Cir. 1993).  3123 SMB LLC, 
880 F.3d at 466–67. 
 157. Id. at 467.  The Corporation in Johnson, on the other hand, had held forty board 
meetings at the time its lawsuit was filed.  See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
 158. Id. 
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diversity purposes[] and is therefore only a citizen of its state of incorporation,” 
the Ninth Circuit recalled that it described the notions suggested by those cir-
cuits as logically “perverse” in a previous decision without taking a definitive 
stance.159  Even though the Ninth Circuit did not announce how it thought “in-
active” corporations should be treated in a principal place of business inquiry, 
it concluded, in stark opposition to the findings of the Central District of Cali-
fornia, that “[the Corporation in 3123 SMB LLC], which doesn’t do much at 
all, did nothing for [twenty-five] days.”160 
3. The Ninth Circuit’s Determination that the Corporation’s Principal 
Place of Business is in Missouri 
The Ninth Circuit next wrestled with crafting the citizenship classification 
for the Corporation.  The Ninth Circuit determined that the Corporation’s prin-
cipal place of business was Missouri because the Corporation’s registered of-
fice, where annual board meetings were to be held, was in Clayton, Missouri.161  
The Ninth Circuit further held that this rule should control regardless of 
whether any annual meetings have actually taken place at the time the lawsuit 
is filed.162 
The Ninth Circuit determined the Central District of California’s holding 
– that 3123 SMB put forth no evidence that Lincoln One’s operations were 
directed, controlled, or coordinated from Missouri or anywhere other than Cal-
ifornia – rested on two improper assumptions: (1) “that a holding company’s 
principal place of business is by default in the state where its officers live” and 
(2) “that [a holding company’s] principal place of business can change over 
time as the company holds a sufficient number of board meetings at its true 
nerve center.”163 
First, the Ninth Circuit held that to assume “a holding company’s princi-
pal place of business is in the state where its officers reside is problematic” 
because corporations are not typically directed from their officer’s homes.164  
 
 159. Id. at 467; see also, e.g., Holston Invs., Inc. B.V.I. v. LanLogistics Corp., 677 
F.3d 1068, 1071 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding that such a rule “aligns most closely with 
the Supreme Court[ of the United States’] analysis in Hertz”); Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. 
Hansen, 48 F.3d 693, 698 (3d Cir. 1995) (rejecting any notion that all corporations must 
have a principal place of business).  Although the issue of how an inactive holding 
corporation should be treated for diversity purposes reached the Ninth Circuit in Co-
Efficient Energy Sys.v. CSL Industries, Inc., 812 F.2d 556 (9th Cir. 1987), the court in 
3123 SMB LLC concluded the corporation at issue in that case was indeed active, as the 
corporation’s director and sole shareholder “made business decisions, including the de-
cision to contract with [the defendant] and file [that] action.”  3123 SMB LLC, 880 F.3d 
at 467 (first alteration in original) (quoting Co-Efficient Energy, 812 F.2d at 558)). 
 160. 880 F.3d at 468. 
 161. Id. at 471. 
 162. Id. at 468. 
 163. Id. at 469. 
 164. Id. 
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The Ninth Circuit further reasoned that the place where a holding company’s 
officers reside, without the accompaniment of a designated office space, is 
problematic because Hertz requires that a corporation’s principal place of busi-
ness “is a place within a State.  It is not the State itself.”165  Based on this 
interpretation, the Ninth Circuit held the Central District of California erred in 
finding the Corporation’s principal place of business to be California because 
its inquiry failed divulge a single place within the State of California, such as 
an office space, from which Mary Kling orchestrated the Corporation’s activi-
ties.166  The Ninth Circuit further advised that a rule that looks to the state 
where a holding company’s officers reside would be unworkable in most in-
stances, as holding companies often have more than one decisionmaker living 
in more than one state.167 
Second, the Ninth Circuit held that to assume “a corporation’s principal 
place of business can shift over time without any change to the corporation’s 
structure or operation” would invite more litigation and lead to the sort of 
strange results the Supreme Court of the United States warned against in 
Hertz.168  The Ninth Circuit noted that although in 3123 SMB LLC the corpo-
rate entity was the plaintiff, it will be the defendant in many circumstances.169  
To hold that its principal place of business could change over time “would turn 
on happenstance” – i.e., if a holding company had not held a sufficient number 
of board meetings prior to being sued, then its citizenship would be determined 
by the mere residence of one of its officers.170 
The Ninth Circuit advocated a separate reason in support of its holding 
that a holding company’s principal place of business should be the place it 
plans to hold its annual meetings: “administrative simplicity.”171  The Ninth 
Circuit reasoned that 
[a] rule that forces courts to pick a nerve center from the potentially 
several states where corporate decision-makers reside and to determine 
whether there have been enough board meetings to establish a different 
nerve center would be difficult to administer and generate unnecessary 
litigation on collateral issues.  In contrast, a rule presuming that from 
 
 165. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 93 
(2010)). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. (citing Hertz Corp., 559 U.S. at 94).  In Hertz, the Supreme Court of the 
United States held that “measuring the total amount of business activities that the cor-
poration conducts there and determining whether they are significantly larger than the 
next–ranking [s]tate” would lead to strange results because certain states have much 
larger populations than others, which could throw off the analysis.  Hertz Corp., 559 
U.S. at 93–94. 
 169. 3123 SMB LLC, 880 F.3d at 469. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 469–70. 
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inception a holding company directs its business from the place where 
it holds its board meetings is easy to apply.172 
Notwithstanding its aforementioned holding, the Ninth Circuit noted the 
record in 3123 SMB LLC included evidence from which an “inference [of ju-
risdictional manipulation] could be made.”173  The Ninth Circuit admitted that 
the Corporation’s timely incorporation – which occurred roughly one month 
before the filing of this suit in federal court, near the end of the relevant statute 
of limitations, and just before it brought separate claims arising from Horn’s 
professional mistakes in parallel state court litigation – gave rise to concerns 
of jurisdictional manipulation.174  However, the court also noted the record 
contained evidence suggesting the Corporation was incorporated in Missouri 
for legitimate reasons, such as the Klings’ familial and business ties to Missouri 
and the presence of their attorney in Missouri.175 
Ultimately, the court reversed the district court’s dismissal for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction with the accompanying condition that upon remand 
the district court was “free to consider whether there is jurisdictional manipu-
lation or an alter ego relationship between [the Corporation] and [the LLC].”176 
B. The Dissenting Opinion 
In his dissent, Judge Hurwitz argued that the Corporation’s “nerve cen-
ter,” as determined at the time the lawsuit was filed, was California.177  In Judge 
Hurwitz’s view, the Central District of California correctly found that the Cor-
poration’s nerve center was California because California was where the Cor-
poration’s shareholders and directors resided.178  Judge Hurwitz reasoned that 
a holding company’s “‘nerve center’ cannot be in a state where the corporate 
EEG is flat.”179  Put another way, Judge Hurwitz emphasized that a corpora-
tion’s principal place of business cannot be “located in a state in which the 
company ha[s] done absolutely no business at the time the [federal] lawsuit 
was filed.”180  Therefore, under Judge Hurwitz’s view, the fact that a board 
 
 172. Id. at 470 (citing Johnson v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 724 F.3d 337, 355 
(3d Cir. 2013)).  The court further cited that “[e]ven while cautioning courts to identify 
a corporation’s actual center of direction and control, Hertz ‘place[d] primary weight 
upon the need for judicial administration of a jurisdictional statute to remain as simple 
as possible.’” Id. (quoting Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 80 (2010)). 
 173. Id. at 470–71. 
 174. Id. at 471. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. (Hurwitz, J., dissenting). 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
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meeting was later held by the Corporation in Missouri should not have been 
considered in making the jurisdictional determination in the instant case.181 
Judge Hurwitz wrote that the Central District of California’s finding that 
the Corporation’s principal place of business was California was not clearly 
erroneous because the LLC freely “conceded that there had been no corporate 
activity in Missouri between the day [the Corporation] was incorporated and 
the filing of [its] lawsuit.”182  Even if the majority’s premise that the Corpora-
tion was completely inactive during the relevant period was adopted, Judge 
Hurwitz reasoned that the district court’s dismissal must still be affirmed be-
cause the LLC “presented absolutely no evidence that any . . . direction, con-
trol, or coordination [of the Corporation] occurred in Missouri.”183  In Judge 
Hurwitz’s view, the majority improperly relied on Johnson for the proposition 
that a holding company’s “nerve center” is where its board meetings are sup-
posed to take place.184  Judge Hurwitz found Johnson distinguishable because 
the board meetings at issue therein had actually taken place in Delaware before 
the lawsuit was filed.185  In contrast, no board meetings had been held by the 
Corporation in 3123 SMB LLC before the LLC filed its lawsuit.186 
According to Judge Hurwitz, the majority’s rule “gives rise to the very 
dangers of jurisdictional manipulation that Hertz eschews.”187  Judge Hurwitz 
found it concerning that the majority’s analysis allowed for “[the Corporation], 
having established diversity simply by virtue of its state of incorporation . . .[,] 
[to] safely conduct its business entirely in California but still invoke the limited 
jurisdiction of an Article III court.”188 
V. COMMENT 
In 3123 SMB LLC, the Ninth Circuit decided the place where a holding 
corporation merely anticipates holding its board meetings is sufficient to estab-
lish its principal place of business189 – rendering itself the first circuit to pro-
vide a federal forum to a litigant on the basis of future intentions.  In an un-
precedented opinion, the Ninth Circuit determined a corporation’s “nerve cen-
ter” could be located in a state where the corporation had conducted no busi-
ness activity whatsoever – despite the fact that neither Hertz precedent nor the 
leading persuasive authority from the Third Circuit in Johnson articulated such 
a rule. 
 
 181. See id. at 471–72. 
 182. Id. at 472. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at 473. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 468. 
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First, this Part argues the Ninth Circuit’s proposed “future board meet-
ings” test for newly-formed holding corporations is problematic because it cuts 
against the purpose of the diversity statute in a manner not anticipated by the 
Supreme Court of the United States.  Second, this Part argues the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s decision produces a result that is even further at odds with Hertz than the 
Third Circuit’s Johnson decision.  Finally, this Part argues the Ninth Circuit’s 
holding effectively carves out a “holding company exception” to Hertz,190 ex-
amines the long-lasting implications of 3123 SMB LLC, and explores the mul-
tiple avenues that could be pursued by the courts and/or the legislature to force 
the problematic holdings announced by the Third and Ninth Circuits into com-
pliance with Hertz precedent. 
A. The Ninth Circuit’s Decision in 3123 SMB LLC Defies the Purpose 
of the Diversity Statute Beyond the Supreme Court of the United States 
Anticipation 
It is well-established that the purpose of diversity jurisdiction is to prevent 
the potential for unfair prejudice when an out-of-state litigant is hailed to court 
in a different state.191  In determining whether prejudice exists, emphasis is 
placed on the visibility of the corporation’s activities to the public.192  If the 
prejudice determination turns on the corporation’s visible activities to the pub-
lic, then it is unlikely that the LLC at issue in 3123 SMB LLC would suffer a 
risk of unfair prejudice if it was asked to litigate in California state court.  Cast-
ing aside the legal reality that a limited liability company takes on the citizen-
ship of each of its members for a moment, the LLC in 3123 SMB LLC is un-
doubtedly visible in California and has a principal place of business located in 
California.  Similarly, Horn is undoubtedly visible in California because he is 
domiciled and maintains his law practice there. 
The Supreme Court of the United States conceded in Hertz that anomalies 
may exist even after the adoption of the “nerve center” test, producing “results 
that seem to cut against the basic rationale” for the diversity statute.193  The 
Court reasoned that “accepting occasional[] counterintuitive results is the price 
the legal system must pay to avoid overly complex jurisdictional administra-
tion . . . ,” and this result must be tolerated for the greater good.194  However, 
the consequence of the “future board meetings” principal place of business 
standard for newly-formed holding corporations will be that an onslaught of 
cases may yield counterintuitive results, far exceeding the “occasional” anom-
alous result that the Court was prepared to acknowledge in Hertz.  Because the 
holding corporation model is being pursued with more frequency in the twenty-
first-century business world and because lower federal courts clearly consider 
 
 190. See supra note 10. 
 191. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 60, § 3624. 
 192. See id. 
 193. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 96 (2010). 
 194. Id. 
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the principal place of business of the holding corporation (when it is a member 
of a limited liability company) as determinative of the limited liability com-
pany’s principal place of business, the primary purpose of the diversity statute 
will be disregarded in more instances than originally anticipated by the Court 
in Hertz if the Ninth Circuit’s holding is followed as precedent. 
B. The Ninth Circuit’s Reliance on Johnson and Decision in 3123 
SMB LLC Both Defy Hertz Precedent 
The Third Circuit’s decision in Johnson is at odds with Hertz precedent 
because it suggests that board meetings are somehow more jurisdictionally sig-
nificant when the corporation at issue is a holding corporation.  This analysis 
seemingly endorses a reversion back to the multifactor, “flexible” tests applied 
piecemeal by the federal courts in the pre-Hertz era, muddling the bright line 
rule announced by the Court in Hertz.195 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in 3123 SMB LLC is also at odds with Hertz 
precedent and, in fact, takes the risky analysis presented in Johnson one step 
further.  While Johnson may have barely cracked open the door to treating the 
holding of board meetings as sufficient to establish jurisdiction in the case of a 
holding company, 3123 SMB LLC pushes that door wide open. 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in 3123 SMB LLC meaningfully departs 
from Hertz.  The Ninth Circuit’s determination that corporate citizenship must 
turn on wherever a corporation lists that it will hold board meetings is incon-
sistent with Hertz dicta and produces a perplexing result as a matter of policy.  
If the corporate citizenship determination turns on the concept of the intended 
location of board meetings– as the Ninth Circuit suggests – then it will be all 
too easy for small-business-owner-plaintiffs to create a holding corporation by 
filing the necessary and straightforward articles of incorporation in its desired 
forum, write down that it intends to hold board meeting in its desired forum, 
and secure its “principal place of business” in the state of its choosing. 
In Hertz, the Court declared, “[T]he mere filing of a form, like the Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission’s Form 10-K listing a corporation’s ‘principal 
executive offices’ would, without more, be insufficient proof to establish a cor-
poration’s ‘nerve center.’”196  The Hertz Court further emphasized that a cor-
poration should not be permitted to establish citizenship in a place where it 
“[has a] bare office with a computer” or hosts “an annual executive retreat.”197  
And yet, this is precisely what the Third Circuit allowed in Johnson and what 
the Ninth Circuit further justified in 3123 SMB LLC when reasoning that the 
weight of the Court’s cautionary language in Hertz is somehow less applicable 
to holding corporation structures. 
 
 195. See supra text accompanying notes 80–86 (explaining the pre-Hertz tests for 
principal place of business). 
 196. Hertz Corp., 559 U.S. at 97. 
 197. Id. 
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The corporate citizenship inquiry must instead be based on where the cor-
poration’s high level officers are actually controlling its activities at the time 
the lawsuit is filed.  It is unconvincing that the simple filing of articles of in-
corporation and listing of an address offer enough evidence of a corporation’s 
genuine intent to conduct business in a particular state.  These sorts of activities 
are what the Court in Hertz rejected as being not enough, “without more,” to 
establish a nerve center.198  Similarly, the simple holding of a board meeting 
should not be treated as sufficient evidence of a holding corporation’s intent to 
conduct business in a particular state and should be placed in the category of 
activities that are not enough, “without more,” to establish a “nerve center.”  
Because a newly-formed holding corporation could easily hold a quick board 
meeting immediately upon its incorporation, the concept of board meetings 
cannot be the lynchpin of the principal place of business portion of the citizen-
ship analysis.  When courts attempt to discern an individual person’s domicile 
for diversity of citizenship purposes, they focus not only on residence (i.e., 
where the individual is physically located) but also on the individual’s intent 
to remain in the state as well.199  The Court in Hertz announced a “nerve center” 
test with a similar intent requirement for corporate citizenship – and its rule 
rightfully placed significant emphasis on the intent of the corporation’s officers 
and their location when decisions are made. 
The intent of the corporation’s officers to conduct business in a particular 
state should be properly discerned by looking to the primary purpose of the 
corporation at issue, regardless of how that corporation is structured.  If the 
primary purpose of a corporation is to give direction to another company, as 
was true of the Corporation at issue in 3123 SMB LLC, then the corporation’s 
principal place of business must be where its high-level officers made manage-
ment decisions at the time the lawsuit at issue was filed.  This standard pro-
duces results that are consistent with the “nerve center” rule announced in 
Hertz because it places emphasis on the brain power of the corporation and 
points to a single place within a state. 
In 3123 SMB LLC, the place where any and all decisions about the Cor-
poration, as well as any direction it gave to the LLC, had been given at the time 
the lawsuit was filed was California.  California was where Mary Kling – the 
Corporation’s only high-level officer – provided direct, day-to-day managerial 
control of all Corporate activities, and the record was devoid of evidence that 
she made any decision elsewhere.  Therefore, in accordance with Hertz prece-
dent, the Ninth Circuit should have found California the Corporation’s princi-
pal place of business for diversity purposes and denied the Klings a federal 
forum. 
 
 198. Id. at 97. 
 199. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 60, § 3612. 
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C. Implications of the 3123 SMB LLC Decision and Suggestions for 
the Future 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in 3123 SMB LLC will have long-lasting ef-
fects on the federal court system.  Its holding – that a recently-formed holding 
company’s principal place of business is the place where it plans to hold its 
board meetings, regardless of whether any meetings have occurred prior to fil-
ing a lawsuit – will cause the federal courts to be flooded with lawsuits.  Busi-
ness litigants seeking a more favorable forum may be tempted to create the 
type of business arrangement blessed by the Ninth Circuit solely to take ad-
vantage of federal diversity jurisdiction. 
The more significant effect of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion is that it joins 
the Third Circuit in articulating a faulty “holding company exception” to 
Hertz.200  The Ninth Circuit’s endorsement of the Third Circuit’s view that 
holding companies should be treated differently than other forms of corpora-
tion’s under Hertz will result in a fracturing of precedent across the federal 
circuits.  Different courts will devise different tests to discern the citizenship 
of complex businesses.  This result will achieve the opposite of the administra-
tive simplicity.  Treating holding corporations as distinct from other types of 
corporations may very well open the door to the court’s treatment of each and 
every kind of complex corporate structure imaginable as uniquely situated in 
the “nerve center” analysis.201  Such an approach would allow the exception to 
swallow the rule; the proposed exception would subvert the “nerve center” rule 
and undermine the very certainty the Court sought to establish in Hertz. 
There are several avenues that the courts and/or the legislature could pur-
sue to rectify the holdings of the Third Circuit in Johnson and the Ninth Circuit 
in 3123 SMB LLC.  First, although it is likely the most unsatisfactory of all the 
options described, Congress and the federal courts could wait for this line of 
cases to reach the Supreme Court of the United States so that Hertz may be 
clarified and a definitive answer regarding the principal place of business in-
quiry for holding corporations may be announced.  Second, the courts could 
announce a rule similar to the one announced by Judge Savage in Brewer that 
LLC’s should not be treated as separate entities when their parent corporation 
is a holding corporation.202  For example, the courts could determine that if a 
holding corporation and its limited liability company share the same business 
activities and high level officers, the two companies should be presumed to 
hold an alter ego relationship.  The federal courts could carve out special treat-
ment for holding corporation structures within the alter ego relationship theory 
rather than carve out an exception to the Hertz holding. 
 
 200. See supra note 10. 
 201. See, e.g., Sawyer, supra note 66, at 653; see also Timothy J. Yuncker, Inactive 
Corporations and Diversity Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. 1332(c): The Search for a 
Principal Place of Business, 28 U. TOL. L. REV. 815, 831 n.103 (1997). 
 202. Brewer v. SmithKline Beacham Corp., 774 F. Supp. 2d 720, 722 (E.D. Pa. 
2011). 
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As a third option, Congress could clarify a test for holding corporations 
by statute.  The Supreme Court of the United States has explicitly left to Con-
gress the task of “accommodating our diversity jurisdiction to the changing 
realities of commercial organization” if it sees fit to do so.203  Because holding 
corporation business structures are increasing in popularity, Congress should 
consider crafting a statutory rule for how citizenship is to be determined for 
holding corporations and other atypical business organizations.   
VI. CONCLUSION 
After the Supreme Court of the United States’ decision of Hertz Corp. v. 
Friend in 2010, a corporation’s principal business is its nerve center – its “cen-
ter of direction, control, and coordination” – without exception.204  When the 
nerve center test is applied to a newly-created holding corporation, any conclu-
sion that it is permissible to allow the corporation’s nerve center to be an office 
where the corporation intends to hold its future board meetings – as suggested 
by the Ninth Circuit in 3123 SMB LLC – defies Hertz precedent and allows 
litigants to secure a federal forum based on distant hopes and loose plans.  Con-
sequently, a newly-formed holding corporation’s principal place of business 
will reflect a deceptive center of control rather than the current location of its 
control functions.  This result is inconsistent with 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and the 
holding and reasoning in Hertz. 
The dicta provided by the Court in Hertz – that mere board meetings are 
not enough to establish a corporation’s principal place of business – should 
govern the principal place of business determination for corporations, regard-
less of the specific type of corporate structure presented.  A newly-formed cor-
poration will often have its nerve center in the location where the corporation’s 
officers and directors are making the decisions necessary to establish and grow 
the business.  Because this approach is consistent with the nerve center test 
announced in Hertz and the desirable policy result of administrative simplicity, 
the federal courts should apply this approach when determining a holding cor-
poration’s principal place of business, and any notion that carving out a “hold-
ing company exception” to Hertz is an acceptable method of reconciling any 
existing inconsistencies between Hertz’s “nerve center” test and the nature of 
holding corporations should be emphatically rejected. 
 
 203. Johnson v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 724 F.3d 337, 348 (3d Cir. 2013) (cit-
ing Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 197 (1990)). 
 204. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 93 (2010). 
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